Productive Defensive Capabilities and Procurement

With so much on the plate for the present dispensation at the Centre, one of the focal points would be of how the government can deal with roadblocks in defense procurement and border security. In the recent years, the defense budget has fallen to its lowest level since the 1962 defeat at the hands of China. Military procurement has stagnated as major procurement projects got delayed due to bureaucratic red tape and the blacklisting of almost a dozen defense MNCs.

 The first major change that has been brought in relates to the introduction of the ‘preferred categorization’ in the following order; Buy (Indian), Buy & Make (Indian), Make (Indian), Buy & Make, Buy (Global). While seeking the approval for Accord of Necessity (AoN) in a particular category, say, Buy (Global), it will now be necessary to give justification for not considering the other higher preference categories. This is expected to give a stronger impetus to indigenization.

A method for assessment of indigenous content, based on self certification by vendors, has been given while keeping provision for audit by MoD or its nominated agency, if found necessary. This is aimed at propelling the idea which necessitates more domestic production.  While a penalty has been stipulated for not achieving the required indigenous content at a given stage, a scope to make up the deficiency at later stages has been provided.

The 12^th Defense Plan was introduced in 2012 and this is the 4^th year in running and surprisingly it has not yet got the go ahead with full monetary support by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). The inability to develop suitable small arms after decades of design experience shows the apathy of Indian defense industrial policy. The hope that licensed production might culminate in competitive indigenous designs was revealed as an illusion. Jasjit Singh, in his book, India’s security in a turbulent world says “… India’s military strategy should be based on self-reliance.”  The Indian Air Force has been facing severe combat aircraft shortages essentially because Indian did not take action to raise the force level authorized by the Cabinet in 1963 and has ignored modernization during the past nearly two decades. Air force combat force has come down from the existing authorized level of 39 combat squadrons to around 30 squadrons, which is nothing less than shameful. Wars in the future will have to be fought with “the forces in being”, which means that the force development for the future preparedness and conduct of war will be even more crucial than ever before. Looking at the current trends, it should not be of surprise that under preparedness is a grave concern for the Ministry of Defense both in terms of man power and machine stronghold. Having said that, the limelight should be at credible deterrence capabilities to ensure that the opponent does not sense, wrongly, that our administration is defensively, meek and slow. It is up to the government to provide a solution, and that too a holistic one.

 Jatin Sehgal