Given
that the rehabilitation of the Kashmiri Hindus (also known as Kashmiri
Pandits), most of whom felt compelled to leave the valley owing to a very real threat to their lives, is becoming a major issue of national debate, the national media
has some left-liberal voices that are resorting to whataboutism, pointing to
the genuine grievances of Kashmir’s Muslim majority vis-à-vis the Indian state
(primarily human rights violations by rogue elements in the Indian military and
paramilitary forces) to suggest that the idea of rehabilitating Kashmiri Hindus
in separate colonies is a bad idea. One typical example of the same is this
piece by one Najeeb Mubarki.
For a background of what these left-liberals sympathetic to Muslim communalism stand for, you can read this piece by me on this very forum, which even specifically addresses the issue of the Kashmiri Hindus, and I may also clarify that I am not a Hindu rightist, having written a book aimed at addressing and dispelling anti-Muslim prejudices in the Indian context, which I would request everyone with even the mildest anti-Muslim resentment to persuse with an open mind. That said, let me reiterate the background of the problem of the Kashmiri Hindus here. When the secessionist Islamist militancy (the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘Islamic’ are not the same, ‘Islamist’ referring to a totalitarian ideology of imposing supposedly Islamic values as also a sense of hostility to non-Muslims) erupted in Kashmir in 1989-90 as a reaction against an allegedly rigged election and suppression of peaceful protests against the same by the Indian state (no, I am not absolving the Indian state of wrongdoings, and it is indeed necessary for all sides in a conflict to accept the truth for there to be reconciliation), hundreds of innocent Kashmiri Hindu civilians were killed on account of their faith and pro-India political convictions, being seen as extensions of the Indian state (like innocent Tamil Muslims in Sri Lanka were targeted by Tamil Hindu secessionist insurgents, for not having shared the same secessionist aspirations), which was especially sad, given there had been near to complete Hindu-Muslim harmony in the Kashmir valley when the subcontinent was engulfed with riots during the partition of India (that led to the creation of Muslim-majority Pakistan) back in 1947, and a Kashmiri Hindu friend of mine once shared with me how his maternal grandfather, who was in Lahore in Pakistan at the time of the partition riots, traveled to his also Muslim-majority Kashmir, where it was safe. Many Muslim doctors in the Kashmir valley refused to cure the Kashmiri Hindus injured in attacks by militants in 1989-90, leading them to succumb to their injuries, and the refusal by those Muslim doctors had to do either with endorsement of the militants’ activities or out of fear of the militants, for the militants didn’t hesitate to shoot down even Muslims they perceived as enemies (and indeed, many Kashmiri Muslims seen as having a pro-India posturing, like ailing bed-ridden cleric Maulana Masoodi, were actually gunned down by the militants, similar to Professor Asali, a Middle Eastern Muslim, having to pay for his critique of the ISIS for its maltreatment of Middle Eastern Christians with his own life, or how many moderate Sri Lankan Tamil Hindus were killed by terrorists from their own community). The killings were often accompanied by rapes and other atrocities, other than many non-combatant Kashmiri Muslims shouting slogans from mosques asking the Kashmiri Hindus to leave, leading an overwhelming majority of the Kashmiri Hindus who had till then survived the militancy to make an exit from the valley (some tolerant Kashmiri Muslims gave their Hindu friends asylum in their homes in those troubled times and helped them escape safely, just like Kurdish Muslims in the Middle East have recently been trying to protect Yazidis from the ISIS), which had been their homeland for centuries. Some Hindus, on leaving the valley, died of sunstroke and stress, and on making the exit from the valley, they were made to live in shoddy tents in the midst of insects and scorpions, by the Indian government.
Strangely
enough, there is a conspiracy theory circulating in Kashmir that there was no
major threat to the Hindu minority and they left their homes only to malign the
Muslims in the valley, and here’s a
well-written piece by Kashmiri Hindu writer Rahul Pandita (who has, by
the way, also taken a firm stand against wrongdoings by rogue elements in the
Indian security forces against Kashmiri Muslims, saying that he has lost his
home but not his humanity) exposing the hollowness of this theory. There are,
however, several rational and intellectually honest Kashmiri Muslims (including
some I know personally, such as pro-India Kashmiri Sunni writer Sualeh Keen,
whose brilliantly
articulated defence of Rahul Pandita’s book Our Moon Has Blood Clots against
the allegations levelled by one Kashmiri separatist Gowhar Fazili is a
must-read!), even among the separatists, who do not subscribe to this ludicrous
conspiracy theory. Basharat Peer, a Kashmiri separatist writer, author of the
acclaimed non-fiction novel Curfewed Night belongs
to this category, and even a prominent former militant Yasin Malik has acknowledged that
militants had targeted the Kashmiri Hindus in those “dark” days of 1989-90
(interestingly, there is as much rationale to hold Malik, a hero of very many
Kashmiri Muslims, guilty, certainly at least by association, of the Kashmiri
Hindus’ killings, as to hold Modi guilty of the anti-Muslim carnage in Gujarat
in 2002, but there is a deafening silence against Yasin Malik in ‘liberal’
circles) and some of them have even taken up the Kashmiri Hindus’ cause in the United
Nations human rights bodies. Unlike in the case of the carnage in Gujarat in
2002 in which hundreds of Hindu rioters have been convicted for massacres like
the ones in the Best Bakery, Ode, Sardarpura and Naroda Patiya, none of the
militants who targeted Kashmiri Hindus have been convicted. In fact, the local
Kashmiri Muslim policemen didn’t even pursue the cases against the murderers of
the Kashmiri Hindus seriously, leading the perpetrators of these crimes to not
be convicted. In one such case involving militant Bitta Karate, who had confessed
to his crimes in a recorded interview, the judge was led to remark–
“The
court is aware of the fact that the allegations levelled against the accused
are of serious nature and carry a punishment of death sentence or life
imprisonment but the fact is that the prosecution has shown total disinterest
in arguing the case...”
Like the
killings of Muslims by Hindu extremists in Gujarat, this too has been a sad
Indian reality. Even the writer Arunadhati Roy, who has been a strong supporter
of the Kashmiris’ right to secede from India (a conviction I do not share),
has, to her credit (and I say so despite not in the least being her fan),
unlike many of her somewhat like-minded comrades, been intellectually honest
enough to state clearly that
what she describes as the freedom struggle in Kashmir “cannot by any means call
itself pristine, and will always be stigmatised by, and will some day”, she
says she hopes, “have to account for, among other things, the brutal killings
of Kashmiri Pandits in the early years of the uprising, culminating in the
exodus of almost the entire Hindu community from the Kashmir valley.”
Even
after most of the Kashmiri Hindus left the valley in 1989-90, there have been
sporadic incidents of mass murders of those who chose to stay back, perhaps the
most significant example being the Wandhama massacre of 1998. However, it is
noteworthy that even prior to the eruption of the militancy in 1989, in spite
of largely peaceful relations between the Hindus and Muslims of the valley, the
minority Hindu community had seen its share of violence and vandalism, for
example, in 1963, when the Mo-e-Muqaddas, which is believed to be a strand of
Prophet Muhammad’s hair, was stolen from a shrine in the valley or in 1986 in
the town of Anantnag, and sporadically on other occasions too, like stones
being thrown at their houses if India won a cricket match against Pakistan.
Coming to
the current scenario, while I am against any kind of ghettoisation normally, be
it even intellectual ghettoisation in terms of schools of thought, the repeated
assertion that Kashmiri Hindus must be willing to live in live in mixed
settlements if they want to return is similar to Subramanian Swamy's rants that
every Indian Muslim must proclaim himself/herself to be of Hindu ancestry to
enjoy voting rights. It is not for the majority to dictate to the minority as
to how the latter must choose to integrate, isn't it? And Kashmiri Hindus are
an injured minority of Kashmir, and while I won't deny that a certain section
of Kashmiri Hindus has become bitterly communal (though there is no dearth of
them who are rational and impartial, in spite of what they underwent, and the
rather violent
protests by some communal Kashmiri Muslims only strengthen the
communalists among the Kashmiri Hindus, though it must be noted that there
are rational and impartial Kashmiri Muslims, including some I know personally,
raising their voices against their communal co-religionists too) owing
to what was inflicted upon them, the fact is that no section of Kashmiri Hindus
has, asserting its communitarian identity, been involved in harming Kashmiri
Muslims, and so, any attempt at a 'welcome back' for Kashmiri Hindus should be
without 'if's and 'but's.
Now,
coming to the article from the mainstream media cited at the outset of the
piece. The author of that piece, who has a Muslim name, uses the well-known
abbreviation ‘KP’ for ‘Kashmiri Pandit’ and ‘KM’ for ‘Kashmiri Muslim’, and
accepts that KPs were “forced to leave their homes”. However, further, he
contends that given that KMs refuse to accept the fact that KPs were forced to
leave their homes, and in general, believe in a narrative antagonistic to KPs
(that only recalls those of them who subjugated KMs in collaboration with the
Dogra monarchy, but not those who protested against the Dogra monarchy
alongside the KMs), and assert that they suffered more, the idea of a KP return
in separate enclaves is not a good idea, and while KP return is desirable,
their security should be entrusted to the Muslim majority of the valley but not
policemen or army men. How does he expect even a well-intentioned non-combatant
KM to protect KPs in times of crisis? Who is he to decide for KPs how they
would like to exercise their legitimate right to return? He also makes a
sweeping generalization about KPs who didn’t leave the valley being in
opposition to such separate zones, though Sanjay Tickoo, their perhaps most
prominent leader, has said that even the KPs of his ilk should be accommodated
in such settlements. And so much for some KPs joining KMs in the protest
against separate colonies, it actually turned out that some
of those Hindus were Biharis and not KPs! He has also made passing
references to UN resolutions and the issue of Kashmiri self-determination, and
that has been delved into later in this piece.
Next,
while this is not a narrative from the mainstream media, let me cite another
narrative from the social media-
“The only
anxiety that exists is around separate townships for them, and it's a valid
concern. It's humiliating and communal, and casteist. Safety is ensured by
living together, not by segregation. Fanatics sponsored either by Pakistan or
by India can attack these settlements, and create communal frenzy, resulting in
subsequent butchering of Muslims as collective punishment. Let's admit it, this
has happened. Plz recollect Chhitisinghpora and Pathribal. Also, traditionally
Brahmins have lived in segregated areas known as Agraharams. All the
non-Brahmans in Kashmir are Muslims, and there was minority rule in Kashmir, by
the Hindu Brahmins over the lower caste Muslims (until the workers movement of
1930s, Sheikh Abdullah's land reforms and educational reforms, that is). This
is no different from the caste system elsewhere. Having separate settlements
for them is as idiotic as it's communal and casteist.”
My
reaction to the same, written on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/groups/mvjkl/permalink/1041914775836954/),
is stated hereunder-
“fanatic
hindus butchering muslims in overwhelmingly muslim-majority kashmir, with an
overwhelmingly muslim-majority police and an almost inevitably muslim CM
answerable to a muslim-majority electorate! and fanatics from pakistan
attacking these settlements? so, no faith in the local muslim policemen, many
of whom have died fighting separatist militants?
what about fanatics among kashmiri muslims killing innocent kashmiri pandits in
their settlements as collective punishment for wrongs by the indian state or
imagined wrongs by KPs? *that* is something that has happened, even on
occasions like the disappearance of the mo-e-muqaddas in 1963, in spite of no
evidence of the involvement of KPs or the indian state!
and why is every non-dalit hindu like me branded as casteist by these leftists?
isn't that a communal stereotype, like imagining all muslim men to be sexist? and
why is she going back to the dogra period of history, neglecting that KPs
certainly did not rule kashmir after 1947?
and KPs, being the injured minority that they are, deserve rehabilitation on
their own terms, without 'if's and 'buts's, so long as the legitimate rights of
kashmiri muslims are not violated...”
Further,
given that the 25th anniversary of the exodus of the Kashmiri
Pandits was observed in 2014, there was a
piece by Swaminathan Aiyar, a noted columnist, on their problem, but he
side-tracked into whataboutism pertaining to what the Jammuite Muslims suffered
during the partition riots of 1947 and at the hands of the Dogra monarchy in
the wake of a pro-Pakistan rebellion by Muslims in the Poonch district of
Jammu, citing the book Kashmir: The Unwritten History by Australian strategic analyst Christopher Snedden, which has been hailed by Kashmiri separatists, and
Aiyar suggests that this has been concealed by the Indian media in furtherance
of India’s national interests. However, this contention of his doesn’t hold water,
for Indian narratives do acknowledge the partition riots across the
subcontinent being horrendous (while Jammu was affected, Kashmir hardly was)
and the rule of the Dogra monarchy as being oppressive.
Let us
then begin the story from when the “Kashmir issue”, as we know it, began, and
subsequently, even examine the UN resolutions and the issue of Kashmiri
self-determination. To start with, it was the Pakistani establishment that
tried to coercively capture the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir,
which had been a part of Britain’s Chamber of Princes in undivided India
(unlike Nepal, Bhutan and Balochistan), and the Pakistani tribesmen and
soldiers raped and plundered people of all faiths, though the Hindu minority of
Kashmir was particularly targeted. The claim of the Pakistani and pro-Pakistan
propagandists that the invasion was legitimate, for Jammu and Kashmir was a
Muslim-majority province with a Hindu ruler, with the Muslim majority
unanimously desirous of joining Pakistan, to start with, is dubious. Why do I
say so? To examine this, let me cite certain passages from the book by Christopher
Snedden, which is, by no means, pro-India on the whole and as mentioned earlier, has been hailed by
many Kashmiri separatists (some of the excerpts are lengthy but definitely make
an interesting read and are highly relevant to the topic)-
“despite
the fact that J&K had a Muslim-majority population, the political
inclinations of the people of J&K were far more complex and uncertain”
(page 10)
“neither
India nor Pakistan was guaranteed majority popular support” (page 12)
“J&K
was politically disunited by forces that had strong- and differing-
post-British desires for the princely state's status.” (page 27)
“Despite
J&K’s inherent disunity, Hari Singh’s accession would have been much
simpler had Muslims in J&K been united in their desire for the state’s
future status. Indeed, Muslim disunity is one of the most significant
explanations of why the so-called Kashmir dispute began – and continues.” (page
35)
“…the
core of the problem in J&K was its people. They were ethnically,
religiously and culturally diverse, diffuse and different; they lacked
religious and political unity; they were divided in their aspirations for
J&K’s future international status.” (pages 35, 36)
“An
important trait evident among Kashmiris partially explains why Kashmiri Muslims
were ambivalent about Pakistan in 1947. Called ‘Kashmiriness’ or
‘Kashmiriyat’, a newer term with Perso-Arabic roots, this trait was a
fundamental and apparently long-held part of Kashmiri identity and
culture. Kashmiriness emphasises ‘the acceptance and tolerance of all
religions among Kashmiris’. It is ‘manifested in the solidarity of different
faiths and ethnic groups in the state’. The concept was apparently
epitomized by the patron saint of Kashmir, Sheikh Noor-ud-Din, a Muslim born in
1375 of a Hindu convert to Islam. Popularly known as Nund Rishi, he
repeatedly poses a question in a poem; ‘How can members of the same family jeer
at one another?’ The answer is the essence of Kashmiriness; Kashmiris, whoever
they are and whatever their religious backgrounds and practices, are all
members of one indivisible Kashmir Valley ‘family’. It is a recipe – or
even a requirement – for tolerance.
One
significant consequence of Kashmiriness was that, compared with Hindus and
Muslims in Jammu or northern India, Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus
(Pandits) had relatively few social divisions or antagonisms. While they
nevertheless had disputes and rivalries, the two groups generally were more
liberal and more tolerant and, in many cases, had amicable, even close
relations. This harmony arose because both shared the same ethnicity,
language and geographical region and the same recent history under repressive
rulers comprising Muslim Afghans (Durranis), Punjabi Sikhs (Ranjit Singh’s
empire) and Jammu Hindus (Dogras), although the latter was less repressive for
Pandits. It was important that Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits also
enjoyed a similar culture, including revering each other’s religious figures
and festivals, eating halal mutton instead of beef or pork (even though Pandits
were of the Brahmin or priestly caste that elsewhere usually practised vegetarianism),
and not being particular about ‘defilement or pollution by touch’.
As a leading Pandit put it, ‘Racially, culturally and linguistically the Hindus
and Muslims living in Kashmir [were] practically one’. That said,
Kashmiri Pandits also enjoyed greater influence and economic wellbeing than
Kashmiri Muslims. This was due to the Pandits’ position as Hindu subjects
of a Hindu ruler, from which flowed benefits such as being landowners and their
numerically large involvement as state employees. Nevertheless, relations
between Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits generally were far more amicable
than the relations between Hindu and Muslims in Jammu Province.
One
significant result of the concept of Kashmiriness was that Kashmiris may have
been naturally attracted to secular thinking. This was partly because
they were apparently nor afflicted by the ‘majority-minority complex’ that was
evident among Muslims in other parts of the subcontinent, and partly because
they were ‘a deeply religious people who abhor[red] politically exploitation of
their faith. Hence, the pro-Pakistan stance of the major pro-Pakistan
party in J&K, the Muslim Conference, and its Pakistan ally the Muslim
League was not automatically popular with Kashmiri Muslims. To join
Pakistan simply because it would be a Muslim homeland was an insufficient
reason.” (pages 18-20)
“A
further factor that caused Kashmiris to be ambivalent about Pakistan was the
significant role played in 1947 by Sheikh Abdullah and the political party that
he dominated, the National Conference. Abdullah’s role in J&K is very
important. For over fifty years (1931-82), he was Muslim Kashmiris’ most
popular politician, whether in power or denied it. (Abdullah was jailed
for long periods by the Maharaja, by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, his successor as
Prime Minister in J&K, and by the Indian Government). According to
his autobiography, Abdullah’s political career began as early as 1926, when he
joined the ‘relentless struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed’ and,
desiring to become the people’s savior, began to oppose the Maharaja’s regime
and its practices on an individual basis. He disliked a number of the
Maharaja’s practices, including discrimination on religious grounds,
exploitation of the people through taxation, corruption, the inequitable land
system, and the people’s lack of political freedom. Abdullah sprang to
prominence in 1931 during the major anti-Maharaja agitation in Srinagar, and
event of ‘seminal importance’ that temporarily – but severely – challenged Hari
Singh’s rule. Indeed, it was due to Abdullah’s bold part in this uprising
that he became known as the Lion of Kashmir. A further consequence of
this major uprising was that, as a result of the Glancy Commission formed in
order to investigate the uprising’s causes, the Maharaja allowed the formation
of the first political party in J&K. In October 1932, the All J&K
Muslim Conference was formed in order to safeguard Muslim interest in
J&K. Abdullah, a Muslim, later remained this party the All J&K
National Conference. Espousing secularism, it would later play a
significant role in delivering a large part of J&K to India and in ending
the Maharaja’s rule.
Because
Sheikh Abdullah had a strong aversion to autocracy, he regarded the concept of
Pakistan negatively. Abdullah disliked the Maharaja absolutism. The
United States’ Consul in Lahore agreed: saying, ‘according to all disinterested
informants [the Maharaja] has never displayed the slightest interest in the
welfare of the people over whom he has maintained an autocratic rule. For
Sheikh Abdullah, both Jinnah and the Islamic Pakistan that the autocratic
Muslim League leader envisaged establishing were also unappealing. The
influential Kashmiri leader considered that Pakistan was the result of an
emotional Muslim reaction of Hindu communalism and ‘an escapist device’.
Abdullah and his colleagues, many of whom were Muslims, also received (correctly)
that Pakistan would be dominated by feudal elements, as well as being a society
in which Kashmiris and their reform agenda would have little power: ‘Chains of
slavery will keep us in their continuous strangehold. Conversely,
Abdullah considered that secular India would be different. It would have
people and parties, including India’s major party, the Indian National
Congress, whose views largely coincided with Abdullah and his party. India also
represented an option that would accept the National Conference’s enlightened
and progressive ideas’. It embraced more democracy that either Pakistan
or the Jinnah-dominated Muslim League, ‘whose leader had a very high opinion of
himself’.” (page 21)
Speaking
of the pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference formed in 1941, Snedden says-
“…the Muslim Conference faced a major challenge in the numerically and politically important Kashmir Valley; it lacked a charismatic Kashmiri-speaking politician who could rival Sheikh Abdullah and his coterie of Kashmiri colleagues. The Muslim Conference’s stance also was unpopular elsewhere, especially among the non-Muslim majority in eastern Jammu, as its killings of Muslims were clearly showing.” (page 24)
“…the Muslim Conference faced a major challenge in the numerically and politically important Kashmir Valley; it lacked a charismatic Kashmiri-speaking politician who could rival Sheikh Abdullah and his coterie of Kashmiri colleagues. The Muslim Conference’s stance also was unpopular elsewhere, especially among the non-Muslim majority in eastern Jammu, as its killings of Muslims were clearly showing.” (page 24)
“Although
Jinnah (falsely) believed that J&K would fall into Pakistan’s ‘lap like a
ripe fruit’ once the Maharaja realized his and the people’s interests and
acceded to Pakistan, and although he was prepared to allow the Maharaja’s
‘autocratic government’ to continue, support for independence enabled
pro-Pakistan forces to woo the decision maker rather than the people.
This approach was pragmatic. However, it also made the Muslim Conference
appear keen to gain the Maharaja’s support at any cost. And although this
tactic adhered to Jinnah’s statement in July 1947 that princely rulers were
free to join Pakistan, India or remain independent, many Muslin Conference
members wanted their party’s support for independence reversed. Also, by
allowing the ruler to decide the issue, the Muslim Conference enabled its National
Conference rival to advance the populist – and eminently mire ‘sellable’ – view
that the people should be given self-government so that, ‘armed with authority
and responsibility, [they] could decide for themselves where their interests
lay’. Apart from advancing its own popularity, the National Conference’s
stance also served to reveal the Muslim Conference as simply an appendage or
surrogate of the Muslim League – as it was.
The
Muslim Conference’s pragmatic approach towards the Maharaja built on a previous
stance Jinnah instigated during the National Conference’s ‘Quit Kashmir’
campaign that started on 20 May 1946 with the aim of ridding J&K of Dogra
rule. This campaign was significant between the positions of Jinnah and
Nehru on J&K. Jinnah opposed Quit Kashmir as a movement ‘engineered
by some malcontents’. This stance, coupled with his lack of criticism of
J&K’s unpopular ruler, particularly when compared with criticisms made by
Nehru and the Indian National Congress, made Jinnah appear pro-Maharaja.
This lost the Muslim League leader support among Kashmiri Muslims, especially
among the ‘malcontents’, most of whom were National Conference members.
Indeed, one such National Conference member, Mir Qasim (who later became the
Chief Minister of Indian J&K), believed that Jinnah’s unpopular and
insensitive attitude ‘killed the chances of Kashmir going to Pakistan’.
The Muslim Conference lost credibility because it did not initially oppose the
Maharaja when Quit Kashmir commenced in May 1946 – a policy Jinnah ordered
because he believed that the party would do better working through
constitutional channels.” (page 26)
“…the Muslim Conference appeared to be steadily lose support, certainly in the Kashmir Valley, owing to poor leadership and increased factionalism; conversely, support for the National Conference increased because it was united and had strong leadership.” (page 27)
I may add to this that Jinnah, in his visit to Kashmir in 1941, received much hostility from sections of Kashmiri Muslims and conceded that he did not get unanimous support. To add to that, when he sent an envoy to Kashmir in 1943 to assess whether Kashmiris would be willing to join Pakistan, his envoy gave him a response, which, to use the language of acclaimed historian Alex von Tunzelmann, was "disheartening" (The Indian Summer, p. 284). Jinnah tried to play his own politics in Kashmir, using the minister Ramchandra Kak, a Kashmiri Hindu, as a Trojan horse, but failed, and you can read about the same here.
It may be added that Shaikh Abdullah continued to be popular with Kashmiri Muslims after his having taken a stand in favour of India and after the Dogra monarchy was displaced, Abdullah ensured that land reforms were carried out by abolishing landlordism and giving peasants ownership over land, which won him tremendous affection from the people of the valley. Pakistan had retained the feudal system of landlordism, as it still has, and many Kashmiri Muslims realized that the land reforms in Kashmir were possible owing to Kashmir being a part of India rather than Pakistan. To quote the noted scholar Michael Brecher from his book The Struggle for Kashmir-
“…the Muslim Conference appeared to be steadily lose support, certainly in the Kashmir Valley, owing to poor leadership and increased factionalism; conversely, support for the National Conference increased because it was united and had strong leadership.” (page 27)
I may add to this that Jinnah, in his visit to Kashmir in 1941, received much hostility from sections of Kashmiri Muslims and conceded that he did not get unanimous support. To add to that, when he sent an envoy to Kashmir in 1943 to assess whether Kashmiris would be willing to join Pakistan, his envoy gave him a response, which, to use the language of acclaimed historian Alex von Tunzelmann, was "disheartening" (The Indian Summer, p. 284). Jinnah tried to play his own politics in Kashmir, using the minister Ramchandra Kak, a Kashmiri Hindu, as a Trojan horse, but failed, and you can read about the same here.
It may be added that Shaikh Abdullah continued to be popular with Kashmiri Muslims after his having taken a stand in favour of India and after the Dogra monarchy was displaced, Abdullah ensured that land reforms were carried out by abolishing landlordism and giving peasants ownership over land, which won him tremendous affection from the people of the valley. Pakistan had retained the feudal system of landlordism, as it still has, and many Kashmiri Muslims realized that the land reforms in Kashmir were possible owing to Kashmir being a part of India rather than Pakistan. To quote the noted scholar Michael Brecher from his book The Struggle for Kashmir-
“The vast
majority of Kashmiris have benefited from these reforms and many of those
interviewed by the author expressed the feat that in Pakistan, where no
comparable land reforms have taken place, the land recently given to them might
be returned to the landlords or, in any event, that further implementation of
the 'New Kashmir' programme will be impossible.” (cited in the 2002 paperback
edition of MJ Akbar's book Kashmir - Beyond the Vale on page
139)
Abdullah
had clearly stated in the context of Pakistan-
“The most
powerful argument which can be advanced in her favour is that Pakistan is a
Muslim State, and, a big majority of our people being Muslims the State must
accede to Pakistan. This claim of being a Muslim State is of course only
a camouflage. It is a screen to dupe the common man, so that he may not
see clearly that Pakistan is a feudal state in which a clique is trying by
these methods to maintain itself in power...” (cited in the 2002 paperback
edition of MJ Akbar's book Kashmir - Beyond the Vale on page 139)
Even today, there are Kashmiri Muslims, including those who want their region to be an independent country, who acknowledge that back then, Abdullah had made the right decision by opting for India. As one such person has articulated-
“The first question that comes to mind is would the Pakistani establishment quash the Feudal or Zamindari systems in Kashmir handing the land over to the tillers? Do keep in mind that even today Pakistan is a feudal society with most of the land in the hands of the Punjabi Chaudhrys. I mean all that the Kashmiri Hindus and Dogra land owners had to do was convert to Islam and just like the Punjabi Chaudhrys of Pakistan continue with the feudal system.”
He further says-
“Now picture yourself as a common Kashmiri filling the chillum of a Punjabi Pakistani Chaudhry or that of a Kashmiri Hindu/Dogra Feudal lord with tobacco and ask yourself this question.............how smart was Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah?”
Even today, there are Kashmiri Muslims, including those who want their region to be an independent country, who acknowledge that back then, Abdullah had made the right decision by opting for India. As one such person has articulated-
“The first question that comes to mind is would the Pakistani establishment quash the Feudal or Zamindari systems in Kashmir handing the land over to the tillers? Do keep in mind that even today Pakistan is a feudal society with most of the land in the hands of the Punjabi Chaudhrys. I mean all that the Kashmiri Hindus and Dogra land owners had to do was convert to Islam and just like the Punjabi Chaudhrys of Pakistan continue with the feudal system.”
He further says-
“Now picture yourself as a common Kashmiri filling the chillum of a Punjabi Pakistani Chaudhry or that of a Kashmiri Hindu/Dogra Feudal lord with tobacco and ask yourself this question.............how smart was Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah?”
And by the way, Islam as a religion emphasizes socioeconomic egalitarianism and
the first land reforms in world history were carried out by the caliph Hazrat
Umar Bin Khattab, and so, it is particularly shameful that Pakistan, calling
itself an Islamic state, still has an institutionalized zamindari system, asPakistani
liberal Hasan Nisar points out!
However,
coming back to Kashmir, the pointers raised as justifications for
Pakistan’s armed actions either take the form of whataboutism with respect to
India’s stand on the Muslim-ruled, Hindu-majority Hyderabad and Junagadh, or
cite the pro-Pakistan rebellion in Poonch before the Pathan tribal raid (the
latter point became popular to cite after Snedden’s book mentioned it).
The
Poonch rebellion does go to show that the Dogra king was unpopular among his
subjects, but that is something already acknowledged by Indians and Pakistanis
alike. From the Indian point of view, Jawaharlal Nehru’s trips to Kashmir in
which he peacefully took on the monarchy and even faced arrest in the princely
state are well-known. But when he assumed the role of India’s prime minister,
Nehru did not engage in such adventures and did not interfere, at least
blatantly, in the internal affairs of Jammu and Kashmir, which would amount to
disrespecting sovereignty.
It may
have very well been legitimate for the pro-Pakistan Muslims of Poonch to rise
in armed revolt against their king, just as it may have been legitimate for the
pro-India Shaikh Abdullah to lead peaceful movements against the monarchy in
the valley (and Shaikh Abdullah’s mass struggle had a history predating the
Poonch rebellion in 1947), but how do these become the starting point of what
we conventionally understand as the “Kashmir issue” involving India, Pakistan
and the people of the (now erstwhile) princely state? And if the Poonch
rebellion is indeed taken as the starting point, it can only be on two grounds
- the first being that these rebels wanted accession to Pakistan [in Snedden’s
words-“The only way the Maharaja could possibly appease Poonch Muslims would be
to accede to Pakistan; they would not have settled for anything less.” (page
32)] and the second being that there were elements in Pakistan that supported the
rebellion. To quote from Snedden’s
interview given to Tehelka correspondent Baba Umar (who is
a Kashmiri separatist and happens to be an acquaintance of mine)-“there was
some degree of support from the Pakistan government”.
Let us
examine both points one by one. As regards Poonch Muslims wanting accession to
Pakistan, this hardly goes very far in suggesting that the majority of the
populace in the whole of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir
favoured accession to Pakistan, as the excerpts from not only Snedden’s book
but even other sources stated above, demonstrate.
So, even
if the Muslims of Poonch were united in the demand for the accession of Jammu
and Kashmir to Pakistan, the people (even Muslims) of the entire princely state
were not, and indeed, it has been no one’s case that there wasn’t a
pro-Pakistan section among the people of the erstwhile princely state, but
Snedden himself concedes that it cannot be said with certainty as to what the
aspirations of the majority of the populace were. Hence, Pakistan’s case for
claiming Jammu and Kashmir solely on the basis of its Muslim majority falls
flat, as opposed to India’s case for a majority of people in the princely
states of Hyderabad and Junagadh desiring to join India, which was proved by
subsequent plebiscites. The hurdle in the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir came
not from India, which had already promised the Kashmiris a plebiscite, but
Pakistan, which, in violation of the 1948 UN resolution,
refused to withdraw its troops from the part of the erstwhile princely state it
had occupied in the 1947-48 war following the Pashtun tribal raid, which, as
per the resolution, was a precursor to the plebiscite. Nehru had, in fact, gone
on record even later to say that he was willing to follow the UN resolution
(i.e. conduct the plebiscite) in the whole of the erstwhile princely state if
Pakistan complied with the precondition of withdrawing its troops, as can be
seen from this video (watch
1:58 onwards). Now, it must be mentioned that many Kashmiri separatists who
haven’t read the UN resolution and just know that it calls for a plebiscite
often invoke the UN resolution, but when made to realize that the resolution is
not exactly what they claim it to be, their entire stance changes to ridiculing
international law itself being irrelevant and a conspiracy of Western powers, a
stance diametrically opposite to the one they took before learning of what the
resolution entailed!
However,
if they support self-determination as an absolute right, which is to say that
any part of any country should be unilaterally allowed to secede at will, would
they support any household declaring itself as a separate country and not
paying taxes, desiring to have diplomatic relations with their country, or any
district of the independent Jammu and Kashmir they envisage to secede at will?
Pray, quite the contrary, their leaders do not wish to give Hindu-majority
Jammu and Buddhist-majority Ladakh that right in the independent country they
envisage! And speaking of Pakistanis and those who are pro-Pakistan, given the
secessionist voices in Sindh and the secessionist or pro-Afghanistan voices in
Khyber Pakhtoonwa, are they willing to conduct plebiscites in these particular
provinces?
Also,
when Shaikh Abdullah had later started vacillating in the 1950s between Kashmir
being a part of India with some autonomy, and being an independent country
altogether (Pakistan was still not an option for him, and a reason for
vacillating from his firm pro-India stance was his concern over Hindu
majoritarianism in India, which had manifested itself even in the killing of
Mahatma Gandhi), and Nehru had him imprisoned, Nehru did, on the other hand,
again offer Pakistan a plebiscite! To be quote the eminent writer MJ Akbar on
this point, from his highly acclaimed book Kashmir – Behind the Vale(2002
paperback edition)-
“Within a
fortnight of arresting Abdullah for asking too much of Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru
completely reversed India’s position and offered Pakistan a plebiscite!
The Prime
Minister of Pakistan, now Mohammad Ali, came to Delhi on an official
visit. In the talks Nehru suggested that after the two Prime Ministers
had finalized the preliminary issues, a plebiscite administrator could be named
by April 1954. He even told Mohammad Ali that voting could be done in the
whole state rather than separate Hindu & Muslim regions, and if this meant
the loss of the whole Valley, he was prepared for it! The offer was
confirmed in a letter to Mohammad Ali on 3 September.” (page 154)
“The only
condition Nehru placed was that the American UN nominee Admiral Nimitz be
replaced ad Plebiscite Administrator by someone form a smaller country.
Deeply suspicious of the US, he did not want this superpower’s hand in the
plebiscite.” (page 154)
“If there were any doubts about Nehru’s sincerity in those years about the plebiscite commitment, then surely they should have ended with this proposal.” (page 154)
“If there were any doubts about Nehru’s sincerity in those years about the plebiscite commitment, then surely they should have ended with this proposal.” (page 154)
Akbar
further mentions how Pakistan’s insistence on the US admiral led Nehru to
withdraw the offer. For more on how Pakistan sought to avoid a plebiscite, see this.
In fact,
Pakistan's stand was always to go purely by the will of the ruler, by virtue of
which it had sought to engage Hindu-majority princely states like Hyderabad,
Junagadh, and even Jodhpur and Jaisalmer (in Jodhpur and Jaisalmer, even the
rulers were Hindu, unlike Hyderabad and Junagadh) to join it. It had never
basically adopted the principle of a plebiscite, to begin with.
Speaking
of the second point of how the Pakistani state machinery supported or at least
allowed non-state actors to support an armed rebellion in Poonch, does
acknowledging this help Pakistan’s case? Certainly not, as it would amount to
blatant disregard for international law! It is already embarassing for the
Pakistani state to admit that its non-state actors (Pashtuns) had infiltrated
into another territory! And on this point, we may delve a little more into the
legal status of the erstwhile princely state following India’s independence.
The princely states were, after the British government taking control over
India from the British East India Company, following the Revolt of 1857, no
longer the subsidiary but sovereign powers they were prior to that but
subordinated officially to the British Crown, as Queen Victoria proclaiming
herself to be the Empress of India, demonstrated as also the Chamber of Princes
in New Delhi. However, once the British left India, the princely states
re-emerged as sovereign entities, with the lapse of British paramountcy as
becomes clear from Section 2 of the Indian
Independence Act, 1947, meeting all the four criteria established under
Article 1 of the
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, which are stated
hereunder verbatim-
(a) a permanent population;
(a) a permanent population;
(b) a
defined territory;
(c)
government;
and
(d)
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
As
regards the first three clauses, little explanation is required. But if there’s
any ambiguity about the last one, mention may be made of the standstill
agreements many of the princely states entered into with India and Pakistan,
which they were authorized to do by the British. In this connection,
those who understand Hindi can watch this video (from
11:12 to 13:06).
And Jammu
and Kashmir had entered into a standstill agreement with Pakistan (something
that Snedden mentions in his book on page 9), which was violated by the latter
during the 1947 aggression. The very fact that the princely states could
voluntarily accede to any country again reflects their sovereign character.
However, the British had made it clear unofficially that the princely states
must opt for India or Pakistan. To quote Snedden on this point-
“Powerbrokers
in 1947 also were influenced by the method used to decolonize Princely India
(as against British-controlled India), whereby each ruler was deemed to have
the power – and, indeed, was expected – to accede to either India or
Pakistan. Princely states therefore were considered to be indivisible and
without any independent future. Neither the departing British nor the
future leaders of India and Pakistan sought partition of any princely state
along religious lines, nor would they countenance independence for any of
them. Instead, the British encouraged each princely ruler to consider
geographical factors and the will of his subjects in deciding his
accession. Even though the accession would clearly impact on all of the
prince’s subjects, nevertheless there were no legal requirements or popular pressures
for the ruler to consider either factor. He alone would decide the
accession. And, once it was decided, the expectation was that all of his
princely state would, along with the ruler, join the new dominion of his
choice.” (page 7)
While the
British did convey to the princes that they must opt for India or Pakistan
[this is testified by great Indian nationalist leader Maulana Azad’s account in
his autobiography India Wins Freedom that as early as in 1942,
Sir Stafford Cripps, a British politician representing his government, on a
visit to India, “told the Maharaja of Kashmir that the future of the States was
with India”, that “(n)o prince should for a moment think that the British Crown
would come to his help if he decided to opt out” and that “(t)he princes
must therefore look up to the Indian Government and not the British Crown for
their future” (page 61 of the 2009 reprint) – the demand for Pakistan
wasn’t being seriously considered then; if Lord Mountbatten's account as
narrated to Larry Collins and Domique Lapierre in their book Freedom at
Midnight is true, then Mountbatten had also tried hard to convice Raja
Hari Singh to not entertain fancies of independence], there was no legal
obligation upon them to do so. Thus, legally, it was for the ruler to decide
and in this case, he opted for India, and Alistair Lamb’s contention that the
instrument of accession did not exist on paper has now been disproved with the
document being brought out in the public domain. If the counterargument is made
to run that popular support ought to have been the basis, as was the case in
Hyderabad and Junagadh, then the rebuttal to that has already been stated above
(i.e. that Pakistan did not withdraw its troops, and having to do so was a
precursor to the plebiscite), and it may be added that Pakistan did not conduct
any plebiscite while getting the ruler of Balochistan, which, like Nepal and
Bhutan, was not even legally a part of India, to coercively sign the instrument
of accession in its favour.
Thus,
with all the emphasis given by Snedden to the Poonch rebellion, his contention
that it would suit Pakistan to highlight the same or that it, in any way, tilts
the narrative in its favour, is a flawed conclusion, even in the light of much
of what he has said in that very book! In fact, on the other hand, the
Pakistani narrative so far had only stressed the atrocities of the king's army
in Poonch (to justify the Pashtun tribal raid), trying to overlook that they
were armed rebels backed by the Pakistani state, and this fact exposed by
Snedden only makes Pakistan guilty of violating sovereignty, which is the
cornerstone of international law!
Other than the Poonch rebellion, Snedden has also highlighted that in Jammu, there were communal riots in 1947-1948 as a result of the partition of India (something Swaminathan Aiyar has also highlighted), in which both Hindus and Muslims lost their lives (though Kashmir was largely free from such violence), but again, that only goes to show that there was a section of pro-Pakistan Muslims in the erstwhile princely state, and as we have discussed above, that is something no one denies and doesn’t take us very far.
Other than the Poonch rebellion, Snedden has also highlighted that in Jammu, there were communal riots in 1947-1948 as a result of the partition of India (something Swaminathan Aiyar has also highlighted), in which both Hindus and Muslims lost their lives (though Kashmir was largely free from such violence), but again, that only goes to show that there was a section of pro-Pakistan Muslims in the erstwhile princely state, and as we have discussed above, that is something no one denies and doesn’t take us very far.
The
tragedy of the Kashmiri Hindus is very real, and so is the issue of their
legitimate right to return to the valley. The Indian civil society cannot
choose to be silent on this crucial issue, also because silence on legitimate
concerns like these cedes the space to the Hindu right.
Karmanye Thadani
Karmanye Thadani
